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JUST HOW NECESSARY IS "NECESSARY"?:
THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION IN 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(B)(1)(A)
Matthew Elster*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The word "necessary"... has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits
of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which
increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it
imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by
1
these several phrases.

In 1984, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in National Labor
Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco,2 which gave bankruptcy courts the power
to permit a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement merely by
showing (1) that the agreement burdens the estate and (2) that rejection is the
equitable thing to do. 3 Organized labor responded with predictable outrage
and pressured Congress to take action. That same year, Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 4 which included
11 U.S.C. § 1113. 5 That section governs the standards by which a debtor can

* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., University of Illinois, 2006.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 414 (1819).

2. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
3. Id. at 526.
4. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
5. 11 U.S.C. §1113 (2006) provides in pertinent part (emphasis supplied):
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the
provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV of this
chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act, may assume or reject a collective
bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejection of
a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this
section "trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall (A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered
by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary
modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected partiesare treatedfairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees
with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
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reject a collective bargaining unit without running afoul of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"). 6 Section 1113 was an attempt to reconcile the
competing interests of a debtor in Chapter 11 with those of its representative
union. 7 Due to the hastiness in which it was enacted, Section 1113 left many
8
questions unanswered and provided little in the way of legislative history.
The vagueness of the statute coupled with the absence of any directional
indicators from Congress resulted in a split between the Second and Third
Circuits over the meaning of "necessary" in §1113(b)(1)(A). 9
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided
for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection
(d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative
to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of
such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that (1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the
requirements of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such
proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
(d)(1) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall schedule a hearing to
be held not later than fourteen (14) days after the date of the filing of such application. All
interested parties may appear and be heard at such hearing. Adequate notice shall be
provided to such parties at least ten (10) days before the date of such hearing. The court
may extend the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not exceeding
seven (7) days where the circumstances of the case, and the interests of justice require
such extension, or for additional periods of time to which the trustee and representative
agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty (30) days after
the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court
may extend such time for ruling for such additional period as the trustee and the
employees' representative may agree to. If the court does not rule on such
application within thirty days after the date of the commencement of the hearing, or
within such additional time as the trustee and the employees' representative may
agree to, the trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on such application.
(3) The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the
authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the trustee's proposal and the
application for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of information
provided to such representative where such disclosure could compromise the
position of the debtor with respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is
engaged.
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if
essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparabledamage to the
estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim
changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bargaining
agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with the
needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not render the
application for rejection moot.
(f) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate
or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the
provisions of this section.
6. 29 U.S.C. §151 (2006).
7. Donald B. Smith & Richard A. Bales, Reconciling Labor and Bankruptcy Law: The Application of
11 U.S.C. §1113, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1145,1153 (2001).
8. §1113 was passed without a customary conference committee report, thus the only evidence
of Congressional intent comes in the form of statements made on the House and Senate floors.
9. Compare Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 791 F.2d 1074

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 35:2

Part II of this paper will discuss the line of cases leading up to Bildisco and
the passage of §1113. Part III will analyze the conflicting Circuit Court
decisions of Aheeling-Pittsburg Steel and Carey Transportation, as well as the
subsequent treatment of these decisions by the courts. Part IV will evaluate the
merits of these decisions and attempt to establish a definition of "necessary"
that comports with the policy justifications of Chapter 11 and the NLRA.
Finally, Part V will examine legislation currently pending in Congress that is
intended to resolve any debate on the subject.
II.

HISTORY OF § 1113

Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, an employer and its employee
representative must bargain until the point of impasse before the employer is
permitted to make unilateral changes to a collective bargaining agreement. 10
Employers are further prohibited from terminating or modifying the agreement
without the consent of the union.11 One commentator has held that "[t]ogether,
these provisions impose a duty to bargain that prohibits self-help by
employers.... The duty to bargain has often been cited as the cornerstone of
2
our national labor policy."'
While in most circumstances, employer-union relations are governed by the
NLRA, labor's relationship with an employer in Chapter 11 is governed by the
Bankruptcy Code. Prior to Bildisco, collective bargaining agreements entered
into by a debtor and a representative union were treated as executory contracts,
13
subject to assumption or rejection under Section 365(a) of the code.
Accordingly, employers' decisions to reject collective bargaining agreements
were evaluated using the "business judgment test," which permitted rejection
of an executory contract when a debtor established that rejection would benefit
the estate. 14 This gave debtors the power to reject unfavorable labor contracts
while treating the ensuing liability for breach as an unsecured claim, which
15
must then compete with all of the debtor's other unsecured claims.
The Second Circuit disagreed with this looser standard, and in REA Express
held that the business judgment test represented too low a bar for employers

(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "necessary" means the minimum modifications that would permit
reorganization) with Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that §1113 does not restrict the debtor to modifications that are absolutely minimal).
10. See National Labor Relations Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1992)
11. Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides in pertinent part:
[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless [certain procedural
requirements are met].
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
12. Christopher D. Cameron, How "Necessary" Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look
at the Fate of Collective BargainingAgreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section 1113,
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841,849 (1993-1994).
13. See 11 U.S.C. §365(a) (2006) (providing that a trustee "may assume or reject any executory
contract" with court approval).
14. Cameron, supra note 12, at 850.
15. Smith and Bales, supra note 7, at 1148.
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seeking to reject their collective bargaining agreements. 16 There, the court
attempted to reconcile an apparent conflict between Chapter 11 and the
Railroad Labor Act (an act similar in language and purpose to the NLRA),
holding that a court could permit the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only where "after careful weighing of all the factors and equities
involved, including the interest sought to be protected by [federal labor
law],... an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining
agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing [employer] in bankruptcy from
collapse, the court may... authorize rejection... of the agreement." 17 This test
essentially required a debtor to meet the extraordinary burden of
demonstrating that, unless the court permitted the rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement, the reorganization would fail. 18
In the coming years, numerous circuit courts refused to follow the Second
Circuit's decision in REA Express, instead opting to apply a less onerous test;
permitting rejection if the estate was burdened and the balance of equities
favored rejection. 19 In 1982, the Third Circuit decided in In re Bildisco,20 which
expressly rejected the stringent, pro-labor standard of the Second Circuit,
imposing instead far less rigorous requirements on debtors. There the Court
held that "the debtor [] must first demonstrate that the continuation of the
collective bargaining agreement would be burdensome to the estate; [and] once
this threshold determination has been made the debtor [] must make a factual
presentation sufficient to permit the bankruptcy court to weigh the competing
equities." 21 This conflict between the Second and Third Circuits prompted the
22
Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
In Bildisco, the debtor entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
23
which was explicitly binding even in the event of bankruptcy.
union
its
Subsequent to filing its Chapter 11 petition, the debtor failed to meet its
obligations under the agreement by refusing to pay health and pension benefits
and failing to provide scheduled wage increases. 24 These violations led the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to issue a complaint against the
debtor, alleging violations of §§8(a)(1),(5) of the NLRA for unilateral
modification of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 25 After filing
the complaint, the debtor sought permission, under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, to reject its collective bargaining agreement. 26 At the hearing on the

16. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 423
U.S. 1017 (1975).
17. Id. at 169.
18. Judith DeMeester Nichols, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors: The Necessity Requirement Under Section 1113, 21 GA. L. REV. 967,980 (1987).
19. Id. at 981 n. 48.
20. 682 F.2d 72 (3d. Cir. 1982), afrd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
21. Id. at 81.
22. National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
23. Id. at 518.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 519.
26. 11 U.S.C. §365(a) (2006) (setting forth procedures for rejection or assumption of executory
contracts in Chapter 11).
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application, a general partner of the debtor testified that rejecting the agreement
would save the debtor approximately $100,000. The bankruptcy court then
27
granted the debtor's application to reject its collective bargaining agreement.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court held that although collective
bargaining agreements were executory contracts subject to rejection under §
365(a), they required a stricter standard for rejection than the business
judgment test. 28 But rather than applying the strict requirements of REA
Express, the Court, affirmed the decision below and held that rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement should be permitted by a Bankruptcy Court "if
the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining agreement burdens the
estate, and that after careful scrutiny the equities balance in favor of rejecting
the labor contract." 29 With the fundamental purposes of Chapter 11 in mind,
namely the prevention of liquidation of the debtor, 30 the Court reasoned that
the "authority to reject an executory contract is vital to the basic purpose of a
Chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can release the debtor's estate from
31
burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization."
Prior to Bildisco, employers were utilizing Chapter 11, or the threat thereof,
as a means of either voiding labor agreements or extracting painful concessions
from their representative unions. Bildisco removed a significant impediment for
employers seeking to do just that. 32 After Bildisco, an employer seeking to free
itself from the obligations of an inconvenient collective bargaining agreement
would simply have to demonstrate that its contractually mandated high labor
33
costs hinder its competitiveness.
The Bildisco decision "provoked a general outcry (from management in
support of the decision, from organized labor in opposition)." 34 Labor leaders
immediately began lobbying Congress, which was already in the process of
drafting new amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in the wake of Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 35 Less than a month after the
Court rendered its Bildisco decision, the House of Representatives began
debating a set of bankruptcy amendments, proposed by Congressman Peter

27. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 519.
28. Id. at 524.
29. Id. at 526.
30. Smith and Bales, supra note 7, at 1153.
31. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 529.
32. Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective BargainingAgreement - A Brief Lesson in the
Use of the ConstitutionalSystem of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293,304 (Fall 1984).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 293. See also Id. at 313-14 n. 125-129 (presenting various negative and positive
responses to Bildisco from labor and management, respectively).
35. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding that Bankruptcy Courts created by the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. 95-598, §§404-05, 92 Stat. 2549, 2683-85, were unconstitutional, as they "impermissibly
removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Article III district
court .... Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to
create adjuncts to Article III courts.") The Court stayed implementation of this decision in order to
give Congress ample time "to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of
adjudication." Id. at 88. The stay expired before Congress was able to enact new legislation, forcing
bankruptcy courts to operate under an emergency interim rule for two years before Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Supra, note 5.
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Rodino, intended to codify the recently overturned REA Express standard in the
Bankruptcy Code. 36 The new standard proposed in this bill permitted a
bankruptcy court to approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
only if "absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs covered by such agreement
37
If
will be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor will fail."
adopted, this bill would have "allowed rejection only if necessary to prevent
38
liquidation of the debtor and to preserve jobs."
The House bill and its strict standard for rejection met stiff resistance in the
Senate. Senator Strom Thurmond proposed an alternative amendment drafted
by the National Bankruptcy Conference, 39 which rejected Congressman
Rodino's proposed REA Express standard, and instead essentially codified the
In response to Senator Thurmond's
standard set forth in Bildisco.40
unabashedly anti-labor amendment, Senator Robert Packwood proposed an
alternative amendment, favored by organized labor, 41 which prohibited
unilateral rejection while removing the House bill's requirement that the
modifications be necessary to preserve jobs.42 In the end, the Senate decided
not to adopt either amendment, and sent the bill to a conference committee to
43
find a middle ground between the Thurmond and Packwood proposals.
At 3:00am on June 28, 1984, after two days of deliberation, the conference
committee reached a compromise on the bill, which President Reagan signed
into law. 44 The committee seemingly combined elements from the Thurmond
and Packwood amendments, 45 but failed to include any reports or hearing
36. See 130 CONG. REC. H1723 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino) ("[t]he bill
would require the bankruptcy judge to apply the standard used in the second circuit REA Express
opinion in determining whether to approve a request for the rejection of a collective-bargaining
agreement under the bankruptcy laws: Under this standard, the collective-bargaining agreement
would not be subject to rejection in a chapter 11 case, unless the jobs covered by the collectivebargaining agreement would otherwise be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor
would fail .... This bill clarifies the Congress intent [sic] to incorporate the second circuit standard
for the rejection of a union agreement in a Chapter 11 reorganization case and presents a proper
balance between bankruptcy and labor policies.").
37. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed. Mar. 21,1984).
38. Peter B. Brandow, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy: Finding a
Balance in 11 U.S.C. § 1113,56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233,1243 (1987-1988).
39. Id.
40. Amendment No. 3083 to H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S6126 (daily ed.
May 22, 1984) (authorizing a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement when "the
agreement is burdensome to the estate, and that in considering the needs of the debtor, the
employees covered by the agreement, and other parties in interest, the equities balance in favor of
the rejection of the agreement.").
41. Nichols, supra note 18, at 985.
42. Amendment No. 3112 to H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S6181-82 (daily ed.
May 22, 1984) (A Bankruptcy Court could permit the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
if "[the debtor made] a proposal ... providing for the minimum modifications in such employees
benefits and protections that would permit the reorganization, taking into account the best estimate
of the sacrifices expected to be made by all classes of creditors and other affected parties to the
reorganization; and ... the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.").
43. Brandow, supra note 38, at 1244-1245.
44. See In re Century Brass, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, at 266-67 (1986) ("A House-Senate Conference
Report adopted a compromise approach to the conflict by overruling the unilateral power to reject
given the debtor in Bildisco, and by setting forth certain requirements to be met before rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Report was passed overwhelmingly in both Houses....").
45. 130 CONG. REC. 130 S8890 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement if Sen. Dole) ("The conference
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records that normally accompany the enactment of a bill, leaving little more
than the transcripts of floor debates as tools for divining legislative intent. 46
Section 1113 of the act governs the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements. It mandates that after filing for rejection with the court, a debtor
must:
make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered
by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary
modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to
permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor
47
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
The court must then find (1) that the debtor fulfilled the above
requirements, 48 (2) that the union refused to accept the debtor's proposals
50
without good cause, 49 and (3) that rejection would be the equitable outcome.
Within fourteen days of receiving the debtor's application, the court must hold
a hearing, 51 and issue a ruling in the following thirty days.5 2 In certain
situations, a debtor may need to make modifications which are absolutely vital
to the continuation of its business, in which case a court may permit the debtor
to unilaterally modify the "terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules"
53
provided for in a collective bargaining agreement.
54
One of the first decisions to elaborate on § 1113 was American Provision,
which unpacked the requirements of § 1113 into nine requirements that must be
55
met before the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement can be approved.
compromise evenly splits the difference between Bildisco and Packwood. It overturns the court
ruling with regard to unilateral rejection, and requires now a prior court hearing and ruling upon
an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. In addition, it inserts into the law
a requirement upon the debtor that the debtor make a proposal, for necessary modifications in the
collective bargaining agreement that are necessary to permit reorganization.").
46. Nichols, supra note 18, at 986 n. 65 ("Normally, the enactment of a bill leaves in its wake an
extensive record, including public hearings, a committee report, records of committee hearings,
briefs for and against the bill, and explanatory memoranda.").
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1) (emphasis supplied).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(1).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2).
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2).
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e).
54. 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
55. These nine requirements are as follows:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify the collective
bargaining agreement.
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information available at
the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing on
approval of the rejection of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must
meet at reasonable times with the Union.
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While these requirements have been widely adopted by bankruptcy courts, 56
the application of these criteria does little to resolve the question of how
"necessary" should be interpreted in § 1113(b)(1). In the twenty years since §
1113 became law, the Supreme Court has not provided guidance on how certain
provisions are to be interpreted.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1113(b) (1) (A)
Since the enactment of § 1113, courts have grappled with a statute that not
only contains vague language, but also lacks any meaningful legislative history
that could be used to resolve these vagaries. A glaring example of this
deficiency comes in § 1113(b)(1)(A), which requires debtor seeking rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement to "provide [] for those necessary modifications
in the employees [sic] benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor." 5 7 The Second and Third Circuits each addressed
this issue in the late 1980s; however each court came to a very different
conclusion.
The Third Circuit was the first court to address the "necessary" issue in
There, the debtor-employer entered into
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel. 58
negotiations with the plaintiff-union over a new collective bargaining
agreement, seeking to lower its average labor costs from over twenty one
dollars to nineteen dollars an hour.5 9 Concurrently, the debtor sought major
concessions from its lenders and stockholders, which it did not receive.The
union and the lenders each rejected the other's proposals, and eventually
negotiations between the parties broke down. Soon after this, the debtor filed
for Chapter 11 protection. 60 Following its bankruptcy petition, the debtor
proposed new modifications to the union, this time asking for labor costs of
fifteen dollars an hour and for cuts in benefits. After giving the union three
weeks to deliberate, and refusing to provide them with more information, the
debtor filed an application to reject its collective bargaining agreement with the
bankruptcy court. 61 The court approved the debtor's application and the union
immediately appealed and commenced a strike to protest the debtor's unilateral
changes to the terms of employment. 62 The district court affirmed the decision

7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually
satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.
8. The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
56. See Smith & Bales, supra note 7, at 1157.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
58. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.
1986).
59. Id. at 1077.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1078.
62. Id.
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of the bankruptcy court and the union appealed to the Third Circuit.63
The Third Circuit analyzed the events leading up to the enactment of § 1113
and the sparse legislative history that came with it in an attempt to find the
correct definition of "necessary." After looking at statements made by various
Senators regarding the product of the conference committee, the court
determined that the general consensus in Congress was that Bildisco had been
overturned and a standard similar to REA Express had been instated. 64 In light
of this congressional intent, the court construed "necessary" to mean
.essential," holding:
The "necessary" standard cannot be satisfied by a mere showing that it
would be desirable for the trustee to reject a prevailing labor contract so that the
debtor can lower its costs.... The congressional consensus.., requires that
"necessity" be construed strictly to signify only modifications that the trustee is
constrained to accept because they are directly related to the Company's financial
condition and its reorganization. We reject the hypertechnical argument that
"necessary" and "essential" have different meanings because they are in
65
different subsections. The words are synonymous.
The court essentially held that a debtor's proposed modifications must be
absolutely necessary (rather than simply desirable) for achieving the short-term
goal of preventing liquidation (rather than for achieving the long-term goal of a
successful reorganization). 66 In applying this standard to the facts of the case,
the court determined that the bankruptcy court erred because the debtor's
proposed modifications were not absolutely necessary to prevent liquidation,
and that it incorrectly focused its analysis on the long-term viability of the
67
debtor.
A year later, the Second Circuit became the next circuit court to attempt to
define "necessary" in § 1113.
In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey
68
Transportation Inc., the debtor, facing a rapidly declining business, asked for
and received numerous concessions from its representative union, enabling it to
reduce operating costs. 69 These concessions proved inadequate, and the debtor
sought further concessions from the union which the union denied, resulting in
the debtor's filing of a Chapter 11 petition. 70 The next day, the debtor applied

63. See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 52 B.R. 997, 1003 (Bankr. W. D. Pa. 1985) (holding
that "'necessary'... does not mean 'absolutely essential.' A more practical long range test of a less
stringent nature is more compatible with congressional intent.... The prevention of the debtor
going into liquidation, ensuring the loss of jobs, is a goal and policy decision of the Bankruptcy
Code which indicates an intent of Congress to impose a 'necessary' standard to be satisfied by
considerations of feasibility for reorganization.").
64. lheeling-PittsburghSteel, 791 F.2d at 1088 ("the tide of members of Congress who expressed
an otherwise pervasive understanding that the substantive standard of Bildisco had been
overturned and that the REA Express standard, or something close to it, had been reinstated.").
65. Id. (emphasis supplied).
66. Carlos J. Cuevas, Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Search for
the Substantive Standard for Modification of a Collective Bargaining Agreement in Corporate
Reorganization, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133,182 (1990).
67. Wlheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1093.
68. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 85.
70. Id. at 86.
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for permission to modify its collective bargaining agreement, proposing freezes
or cuts in wages, reductions in overtime and vacation time, and the elimination
of various employee benefits, in an effort to save approximately $1.8 million per
year for three years. 71 The union refused to negotiate on these proposals and
the debtor filed an application to reject its bargaining agreement. During
hearings on the application, the union put forth proposals that would have
saved the debtor approximately three quarters of a million dollars per year, but
the debtor rejected this proposal. The bankruptcy court, applying the nine step
test from American Provision, granted the debtor's request to reject its collective
bargaining agreement, finding that the debtor had complied with both the
substantive and procedural requirements of § 1113.72
Affirming the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the Second Circuit
declined to adopt the strict definition of necessary from Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel advocated by the union, finding this line of reasoning flawed for three
reasons: First, while statute was generally viewed as a victory for organized
labor, Congress explicitly rejected the language in Senator Packwood's proposal
which would have required a debtor to propose only bare minimum
modifications. Second, limiting a debtor to proposing only bare-minimum
modifications would make it impossible for that debtor to fulfill the rest of its
statutory obligations, namely its duty to negotiate in good faith. 73 Third,
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel incorrectly focused its decision on the need for the
debtor's short term survival rather than its eventual reorganization. The court
held that it would be "impossible to weigh necessity as to reorganization
without looking into the debtor's ultimate future and estimating what the
debtor needs to attain financial health. ... A debtor can live on water alone for a
short time but over the long haul it needs food to sustain itself." 74 Therefore,
the court concluded Section 1113 requires a debtor's proposed modifications to
its collective bargaining agreement to contain "necessary, but not absolutely
minimal, changes that will enable [it] to complete the reorganization process
75
successfully."
In 1990, the Tenth Circuit also weighed in on the "necessary" debate,
adopting the Second Circuit's more debtor-friendly definition from Carey
Transportation. In Mile Hi Metal76 the debtor filed a petition for Chapter 11 relief
and then sought approval to reject its collective bargaining agreement under §
1113. The debtor held negotiation sessions with its union, but the union did not
accept any of the debtor's proposals. 77 The Bankruptcy Court granted the

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Carey Transportation, 816 F.2d at 89 ("Because the statute requires the debtor to negotiate in
good faith over the proposed modifications, an employer who initially proposed truly minimal
changes would have no room for good faith negotiating, while one who agreed to any substantive
changes would be unable to prove that its initial proposals were minimal.").
74. Id. at 89-90 (quoting In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 90.
76. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 9 v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir.
1990).
77. Id. at 888 (the debtor proposed (1) prohibiting the presence of a union steward on a job
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debtor's application to reject its collective bargaining agreement and the union
appealed. The District Court, in reversing the decision of the bankruptcy judge,
held that § 1113 did not permit a debtor to make non-essential modifications,
78
such as those that affected competitiveness, but not wages.
Vacating the decision of the District Court, the Tenth Circuit held that while
"in ordinary usage, 'necessary' means 'cannot be done without' or 'absolutely
required,' ' 79 in bankruptcy proceedings, necessary modifications must enable
the debtor to reorganize successfully, without being absolutely minimal. The
court tempered this loose definition with one caveat, holding that "the debtor
may not overreach under the guise of proposing necessary modifications. The
proposals must be more than potentially helpful; they must be directly related to
80
the debtor's financial condition."
Since Mile Hi Metal, no other circuit courts have addressed the issue of
necessity of proposed modifications, and Bankruptcy Courts have been split
81
between the two approaches advocated by the Third and Second Circuits.
While the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the matter, various authors
have attempted to reconcile these competing approaches.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section will evaluate the merits of the two competing Circuit Court
approaches to "necessity," and attempt to come to a correct interpretation.
Analyzing these two approaches, it becomes clear that they represent the two
extreme ends of a spectrum, with an entirely too restrictive definition on one
side and a far too permissive interpretation on the other. A proper definition of
necessity should fall somewhere in the middle, striking a balance between the
respective needs of debtors and organized labor.
A.

The Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Standard

The Third Circuit's Wheeling-PittsburghSteel definition of necessity stands at
the most restrictive end of the spectrum. The flaws in this analysis are readily

unless three or more union employees were present, (2) hiring temporary employees to replace
striking employees without requiring them to become union members, and (3) paying replacement
employees less than union wages).
78. 67 BR. 114 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
79. Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 892.
80. Id. at 893 (emphasis supplied).
81. For bankruptcy court decisions advancing the Third Circuit's strict standard of necessity, see
generally In re William P. Brogna and Company, Inc., 64 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1986) (holding
that "necessary" is synonymous with "essential); In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S. D.
Ohio 1985) (holding that because Congress intended a narrow reading of the statute, modifications
must be absolutely necessary to the debtor's reorganization.). For decisions advancing the Second
Circuit's flexible definition of necessary, see generally In re Allied Delivery System, Co., 49 B.R. 700,
702 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that "in the context of [§1113], 'necessary' must be read as a
term of lesser degree than 'essential.'"); In re Walway Company, 69 B.R. 967, 973 (Bankr. E. D. Mich.
1987) (holding that "'necessary' means a modification that will result in a greater probability of a
successful reorganization than if the contract were allowed to continue in force."); In re Amherst
Sparkle Market, Inc., 75 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that "the legislative history
is strongly suggestive that 'necessary' should not be equated with 'essential' or bare minimum.").
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apparent. Section 1113(b)(2) requires a debtor to "confer in good faith [with a
union] in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of [a
collective bargaining] agreement." 8 2 Bankruptcy courts have interpreted this
requirement to include serious attempts at negotiation of reasonable
modifications to collective bargaining agreements. 83 As the court in Allied
Delivery articulated, application of the Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel standard,
equating "necessary" with "essential," would render the requirements of §
1113(b)(2) meaningless. 84 In short, adopting the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
definition would place an impossible burden on the debtor to negotiate in good
faith. If it is only permitted to propose those modifications that are absolutely
essential to reorganization, the debtor would logically be unable to give up any
ground while negotiating those modifications, as doing so would place the
absolute necessity of those proposals somewhere above the level of "bare
minimum." On the other hand, a debtor's strict adherence to its absolutely
essential proposals would render it incapable of negotiating in good faith, for if
the debtor granted any concessions, liquidation would theoretically result.
Therefore, the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel standard places the debtor in a Catch22: either it violates § 1113(b)(2) by failing to bargain in good faith, or it violates
§ 1113(b)(1)(A) by proposing modifications that are not absolutely essential for
modification. This approach severely impairs the ability of the debtor to
bargain in good faith with the union, thus frustrating one of the core purposes
of the NLRA. 85 Additionally, this approach encourages the union to avoid the
bargaining table. The deck is stacked heavily in the union's favor, a union
would have very little incentive to accept a debtor's proposed modifications
because that debtor would carry the difficult burden of demonstrating their
86
absolute necessity.
Furthermore, the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel court's insistence that all
proposals be directly related to economic issues87 frustrates the purposes of the
NLRA by constraining the parties to negotiation over only those issues relating
directly to the terms and conditions of employment that would have a direct
financial impact on the debtor. This limitation prevents the parties from
entering into negotiations regarding ancillary issues that, while not economic,
would still have an impact on the debtor's short and long term survival,
including issues relating to working conditions, employee benefits, hours, and

82. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2).
83. See generally In re Kentucky Truck Sales, 52 B.R. 797, 801-02 (Bankr. W. D. Ky. 1985).
84. Allied Delivery System, 49 B.R. at 702 (holding that the strict interpretation of necessity
"would ... render the subsequent requirement of good faith negotiation, which the statute requires
must take place after the making of the original proposal and prior to the date of the hearing,
meaningless, since the debtor would thereby be subject to a finding that any substantial lessening of
the demands made in the original proposal proves that the original proposal's modifications were
not 'necessary."').
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (stating that "[it is declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining .. for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment .....
86. See Cuevas, supra note 67, at 197 n. 457.
87. See Wheeling-PittsburghSteel, 791 F.2d at 1089 (holding that the debtor is limited to proposals
that "are directly related to the Company's financial condition and its reorganization.").
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seniority.
Turning away from application of the statute and to Congress's intent
during its drafting, it becomes apparent that the Third Circuit's hasty dismissal
of the language of § 1113(e) was premature. 89 Presumably, Congress acted
intentionally when it opted to use "necessary" in § 1113(b)(1)(A) and
"essential" in § 1113(e), and for good reason. Section 1113(e) sets out the
procedural requirements that a debtor must follow to make unilateral interim
changes to the collective bargaining agreement when they are "essential to the
continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage
to the estate." 90 Modifications under § 1113(e) are meant to be temporary, and
made contemporaneously with the ongoing negotiation over permanent
changes mandated by § 1113(b). Section 1113(e) essentially represents a
codification of the "onerous and burdensome" standard from REA Express, and
is meant to be applied only in the most dire of circumstances. Section
1113(b)(1)(A), on the other hand, sets a lower standard for modification and is
intended to apply under circumstances where the parties have already engaged
91
in negotiation.
The Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel standard also insufficiently answers the
question of "necessary to what," holding that modifications must be necessary
to prevent the short term liquidation of the debtor. In light of the structure of §
1113, however, this requirement simply does not make sense. Read as a whole,
the statute clearly provides the procedures a debtor must follow when seeking
short term relief. The language of § 1113(e), authorizing interim changes to a
collective bargaining agreement, suggests the purpose of that section is to
permit the debtor to take steps necessary to keep the debtor's business going. If
§ 1113(b)(1)(A) were meant to serve this same purpose, § 1113(e) would be
superfluous. In light of these flaws, it is apparent that the Third Circuit's
definition of necessary is incorrect.
B.

The Carey TransportationAlileHi Metal Standard

The Carey Transportationstandard provides a much better starting point for
determining a workable definition of necessary than the Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel standard. This standard's focus on the long term reorganization of the
debtor is more in line with the overall goals of bankruptcy, as well as

88. See Smith & Bales, supra note 8, at 1169 (citing Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics
of Collective BargainingAgreements, 91 COM. L.J. 169,198 n. 121 (1986)).
89. The court devoted a mere two sentences to this argument, stating "We reject the
hypertechnical argument that 'necessary' and 'essential' have different meanings because they are
in different subsections. The words are synonymous." Wheeling-PittsburghSteel, 791 F.2d at 1088.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (2006).
91. See Cuevas, supra note 66, at 189 n. 413 ("The standard for obtaining interim relief is in
essence the onerous and burdensome test because the trustee must demonstrate that absent the
modifications to the collective bargaining agreement the debtor would be compelled to cease
operating.... The standard for permanent relief is less strenuous because the modifications must be
necessary to permit reorganization. . . . The word essential was not used to define necessary
modification in section 1113(b)(1)(A). Hence, the term necessary modification does not mean
essential modification.") (citations omitted).
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Congress's intent. Despite its superiority, the Second Circuit's looser standard
of necessity still fails to provide a proper definition of necessity that complies
with labor and bankruptcy policies. Without a more concrete definition of
"necessary," Carey Transportationdoes not provide parties with a clear enough
rubric for proposing modifications. 92 While more likely to bring the parties to
the bargaining table, 93 this lack of a precise standard seriously inhibits the
parties' ability to bargain effectively as neither party can be entirely sure that a
proposed modification does not violate § 1113(b).94 This standard also
impermissibly tilts in the favor of debtors. If a debtor is able to prove that
rejecting its collective bargaining agreement will result in economic gains likely
to improve its chances of a successful reorganization, a Bankruptcy Court
95
following this standard would probably grant its application.
C.

ProposedStandard

In order to fully effectuate the dual goals of labor and bankruptcy policies,
an interpretation of § 1113(b)(1)(A) that falls somewhere between WheelingPittsburgh Steel's strict standard and Carey Transportation's loose standard is
required. If interpreted too strictly, proposals that have a high probability of
aiding a successful reorganization will be rejected; 96 if interpreted too loosely,
debtors may be able to rid themselves of inconvenient collective bargaining
agreements by simply demonstrating that doing so would be economically
beneficial, essentially representing a return to the Bildisco standard that
Congress originally sought to eliminate.
The legislative history of § 1113 and the context in which it was enacted
make it clear that Congress intended to hold debtors to at least a slightly higher
97
standard than Carey Transportation's"necessary, but not essential" standard.
In order to better comply with the language and goals of the statute, courts
should apply the following two criterion when evaluating a debtor's proposals
under § 1113(b)(1)(A).
First, courts should ask whether certain proposed modifications are

92. See Carey Transportation, 816 F.2d at 90 (holding simply that proposed modifications must
"contain[] necessary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to complete
the reorganization process successfully.").
93. See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 1113 of
Chapter 11 of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code: Resolving the Tension Between Labor Law and Bankruptcy Law, 2
J. L. & POL'Y 55,85 (1994).
94. See Brian J. Beck et al., Note, Bankruptcy Law - The Standardfor Rejecting Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Bankruptcy: Labor Discovers it Ain't "Necessarily" So, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 96
(1988).
95. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 875, for a statistical analysis of how Bankruptcy Courts have
dealt with the substantive provisions of § 1113, specifically the "necessary" and "balance of
equities" standards,
96. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1090 (denying the debtor's application to reject its
collective bargaining agreement because its proposed modifications did not contain a "snap back"
provision).
97. See 130 CONG. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood) ("the word
'necessary' inserted twice into [section 1113] clearly emphasizes this required aspect of the proposal
which the debtor must offer.").
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reasonably necessary for a successful reorganization. 98
"reasonable necessity" standard would set a higher

Employing this
bar than Carey
Transportation without being too onerous and burdensome. In his concurring
opinion in Mile Hi Metal, Judge Seymour stated that reasonably necessary
modifications "need not be essential to prevent financial collapse" 99 (an implicit
rejection of the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel standard), but without those
modifications, "the debtor must prove that reorganization will probably fail in
100
short order."
This standard of reasonable necessity imposes a stricter standard than Carey
Transportation,but still gives a bankruptcy judge some discretion to determine
whether or not proposed modifications are necessary. Although a debtor
would be given less leeway in crafting its proposals than under Carey
Transportation, to comport with Congressional intent, the application of this
new standard of reasonable necessity should be applied only to modifications
which are substantially related to the debtor's bottom line.
The second prong of the proposed standard involves modifications which
are not economic in nature. Because nothing in § 1113 mandates that a debtor
10 1
make only "necessary modifications.., to permit the reorganization,"
debtors should be permitted (and encouraged) to propose additional
modifications, beyond those directly related to economic issues in collective
bargaining agreements.
Coupled with the requirement that economic
modifications be reasonably necessary, allowing non-necessary proposals
would give the fullest effect to the dual goals of Chapter 11 and the NLRA.
As long as the debtor meets those baseline requirements of proposing
modifications that are economic in nature and likely to facilitate a successful
reorganization, it should be permitted to propose additional modifications that
fall below this necessary standard. This would serve various practical
purposes: It would significantly curtail a union's incentive to challenge a
debtor's proposed modifications for lack of necessity, as a well drafted proposal
would contain at least some modifications related to elements of the collective
bargaining agreement (such as wages or benefits) that have a direct economic
impact on the debtor. 10 2 Additionally, permitting the debtor to propose non-

98. As discussed below, the standard of reasonable necessity should only apply to proposed
modifications directly related to the debtor's economic situation.
99. Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 897 (Seymour, J., concurring).
100. Id. Imposing Justice Seymour's "in short order" element, would shift the balance of power
between labor and debtors back towards the center as it seems to represent a middle ground
between Vheeling-Pittsburgh Steel's myopic approach, looking only to prevent immediate
liquidation, and Carey Transportation'sfar-sighted approach, focusing only on the state of the debtor
post-reorganization. The "in short order" standard takes away the ability of a debtor to simply
state that a modification would help its eventual reorganization by requiring it to demonstrate at
least a somewhat pressing need.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A). A plain reading of the language of the statute suggests that a
debtor is required, but not limited, to make propose modifications that are necessary to permit a
successful reorganization. If Congress's intent was to restrict the nature of a debtor's proposed
modifications to only those directly affecting the debtor's bottom line, it would have included
limiting language in the statute. For an example of a Bankruptcy Court applying a limiting
standard, see In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 1985).
102. See In re Royal Composing Room, 62 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("It is impossible
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necessary modifications would further effectuate the goals of the statute by
making it easier for the debtor to comply with § 1113(b)(2). 10 3 As stated earlier,
mandating that a debtor propose only those modifications that are absolutely
essential to prevent liquidation would make compliance with § 1113(b)(2)
logically impossible. 1° 4 Even under the looser Carey Transportation standard, a
debtor is required to make proposals that are necessary, although not essential,
to the reorganization, essentially limiting the debtor to economic proposals.
If a debtor is freed from the confines of making solely economic
modifications, it will be able to raise issues at the bargaining table that are of
importance to the union, such as work schedules, non-economic benefits,
seniority, and promotions, which are not economic in nature. This would place
the debtor it in the best position to bargain in good faith, giving the fullest effect
to the requirements of § 1113(b)(2), and increasing the possibility that the
10 5
parties reach a mutually favorable outcome.
Encouraging the parties to engage in robust negotiation over a variety of
proposals, not limited to those that the debtor deems essential for its survival,
would significantly reduce the chances of the union going on strike, which is
10 6
often an inevitable consequence when a bargaining agreement is rejected.
Lowering the probability of a strike is highly desirable for debtors as strikes
following the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement often have serious
negative repercussions: cash flows from the manufacture and sale of its
products or services cease, leaving an already cash strapped debtor in even
worse financial straits, while allowing a union with moderate financial
10 7
resources to assert great leverage over a weakened debtor.
A debtor able to propose modifications to a collective bargaining agreement
that are neither economic in nature nor absolutely necessary to its
reorganization may be able to prevent such a strike from occurring. Painful

to conceive of a case in which some aspect of the debtor's projections as to its future financial needs,
the allocation of burden among the various parties, or some item in the menu of modifications in
the union contract proposed by the debtor could not be viewed as unnecessary, inessential or
inequitable. Projections are necessarily speculations about the future and are an art, rather than a
science. The factors that might influence the equities of the allocation of burden or the necessity for
a proposal are numerous.") (emphasis supplied).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Requiring the debtor to "meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized
representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of
such agreement.") (emphasis supplied).
104. See Allied Delivery, supra note 85.
105. But see 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood) ("only
modifications which are necessary to a successful reorganization may be proposed"); id. at H7489
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("[this section] requires the trustee to propose only those modifications
that are necessary") These statements imply a tension between the intentions of Congressmen as
articulated on the House and Senate floors and the language of the final statute and national labor
and bankruptcy policies placing an emphasis on negotiation.
106. Joshua L. Sheinkman, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11 and the
Probabilityof Strikes: Tipping the Balance of Equities, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 513, 532 (1987)
("whether the debtor formally rejects its labor contract or simply fails to perform its contractual
obligations while enjoying the protection of the bankruptcy court, the union is likely to respond by
striking.").
107. Id. at 540 ("[T]wo objective factors ...
should be considered by courts presiding over
bankruptcy rejections: 1) the financial resources that the union can commit to maintaining a strike;
and 2) the ability of an employer to recruit and retain qualified strike replacements.").
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concessions at the bargaining table from both the debtor and labor are an
inevitability of the negotiation process, but if the debtor is able to mitigate the
economic effects of reorganization felt by the union, rejection of the bargaining
agreement and a subsequent strike are more likely to be avoided. While this
standard of reasonable necessity coupled with a debtor's ability to make
additional, non-necessary proposals strikes a middle ground between WheelingPittsburgh Steel and Carey Transportation, currently pending legislation may
finally solve this question once and for all.
V.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The Protecting Employees and Retirees in Bankruptcy Act of 2007 ("the
2007 Act"), which was not passed by the 110th Congress but may be
10 8
reintroduced in the 111th Congress, might render the above analysis moot.
1
0
9
Cosponsored at the time by both the President and Vice President Elects,
and
with widespread Democratic support in both the House and Senate, the 2007
Act faces a strong likelihood of passage in the upcoming Obama
110
administration.
The 2007 Act would substantially modify the requirements of § 1113, tilting
the balance of power in organized labor's favor by placing a higher burden on a
debtor seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement. Looking at the
language of the bill, it is clear that Congress further intended to strip employers
of their ability to use Chapter 11 as a tool to reject collective bargaining

108. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007, H.R. 3652, 110th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). Under these proposed amendments, section 1113 would read:
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under this chapter,
other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the
Railway Labor Act, may reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with
the provisions of this section.
(b)(1)Where a debtor in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section referred to
collectively as a 'trustee') seeks rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, a motion
seeking rejection shall not be filed unless the trustee has first met with the authorized
representative (at reasonable times and for a reasonable period in light of the complexity
of the case) to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually acceptable
modifications of such agreement. Proposals by the trustee to modify the agreement shall
be limited to modifications to the agreement that
(A) are designed to achieve a total aggregate financial contribution for the
affected labor group for a period not to exceed 2 years after the effective date of
the plan;
(B) shall be no more than the minimal savings necessary to permit the debtor to exit
bankruptcy, such that confirmation of such plan is not likely to be followed by the
liquidationof the debtor or any successor to the debtor; and
(C) shall not overly burden the affected labor group, either in the amount of the savings
sought from such group or the nature of the modifications, when compared to other
constituent groups expected to maintain ongoing relationships with the debtor,
including management personnel.
(emphasis added).
109. See
Cosponsors
of
S.
2092,
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2092 (last accessed April 1, 2009).
110. But see Kris Maher, Democrats Push Bill to Protect Workers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2007, at A2
("the bill, which would make the bankruptcy process more burdensome to corporate managers, has
little chance of passing in the Senate because of opposition from business groups.").
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agreements. 111 Despite its unabashedly pro-labor slant, the proposed bill places
a greater emphasis on negotiation than the current act. The new § 1113(b)(1)
mandates that the parties meet in good faith "at reasonable times and for a
112
reasonable period in light of the complexity of the case."
Section 1113(b)(1)(A) of the new legislation places a two year time limit on
the proposed modifications which serves the dual purpose of preventing
employers from using Chapter 11 as a tool for permanently getting out of the
requirements of an unfavorable collective bargaining agreement, and also
codifies a "snap back" provision, intended to prevent an employer from
operating under an unfairly favorable collective bargaining agreement after its
113
position has substantially improved.
The proposed version of § 1113(b)(1)(B) does away with the vague
"necessary" standard and instead imposes a strict requirement upon the debtor
to propose only "the minimal savings necessary to permit [it] to exit
bankruptcy." 114 This bill essentially adopt the strict standard set forth by the
Third Circuit in Aeeling-Pittsburgh Steel, and answers the twofold inquiry of
"how necessary" and "necessary to what" by requiring the debtor to propose
modifications that are absolutely necessary to prevent liquidation.
Section 1113(b)(1)(C) of the 2007 Act provides further protection for unions
above those currently in effect. Instead of approving the rejection only where
the balance of equities favors doing so, 115 the new amendments mandate that
courts place special emphasis on ensuring that the union is not burdened by the
modifications more than any other group. This modification clearly tilts the
balance of equities in favor of labor at the expense of other constituent groups,
such as customers, vendors and shareholders.
The effects of the 2007 Act are not difficult to predict. While courts in the
Third Circuit will not have to drastically alter their standards, those bankruptcy
courts that followed the Carey Transportationinterpretation of § 1113 will now
be required to impose a far stricter test on debtors seeking to reject their
collective bargaining agreements.
In a time of economic turmoil with
historically high numbers of corporations declaring bankruptcy, the enactment
of these amendments will likely have negative ramifications on companies

111. See Office of Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, Chairwoman's Opening Statement at Hearing
on
Protecting
Employees
and
Retirees
in
Business
Bankruptcies,
http://lindasanchez.house.gov/news.cfm/article/433/print/1 (last visited Dec. 2, 2008) ("Chapter
11 is being used by some businesses to bust unions.... In case after case, bankruptcy courts have
applied Congressional intent favoring long-term rehabilitation to sweep aside wage and benefits
concessions won at the bargaining table. Chapter 11 . . . was originally enacted to give all
participants an equal say in how a business - struggling to overcome financial difficulties - should
reorganize. Unfortunately, this laudable goal does not reflect reality, especially for American
workers.") (quotations omitted). See also Maher, supra note 111, at A2 ("labor officials have argued
the bankruptcy process has become an all-too-common strategy for employers who want to void
labor contracts.").
112. The current act merely requires that the debtor meet with the union "at reasonable times...
to confer in good faith." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2).
113. For a more in depth analysis of "snap back" provisions, see Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791
F.2d at 1091.
114. 2007 Cong. U.S. H.R. 3652.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
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already struggling to stay afloat. Critics of the bill have argued that its
provisions would seriously hinder a debtor's ability to successfully reorganize
by raising, rather than lowering, labor costs which may have helped push the
company into bankruptcy to begin with. 116 Corporations already forced to take
drastic, measures to cut costs and remain in business, will likely find that
complying with the strict requirements in this bill places a significant
impediment on the road to successful reorganization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its haste to amend Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the aftermath of
Bildisco, Congress failed to precisely define one of § 1113's most important
substantive provisions. While the goals of the statute are clear - Congress
wanted to restrict a debtor's ability to unilaterally reject a collective bargaining
agreement by imposing stringent procedural requirements of negotiations over
proposed modifications -the lack of an exact standard for bankruptcy courts to
apply when evaluating the necessity of those modifications places those very
goals in jeopardy.
As demonstrated by the inconsistent definitions of
"necessary" adopted by the Second and Third Circuits in Carey Transportation
and Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, respectively, Congress failed to provide a means
for courts to properly balance the competing goals of national labor
(encouragement of good faith negotiations over collective bargaining
agreements) and bankruptcy policies (promoting the successful reorganizations
of debtors). While the standard of necessity used in Carey Transportationcomes
close to balancing these aims, it falls short by imposing too vague a standard on
debtors, which in turn, tilts the balance too far in the debtor's favor.
A better interpretation of § 1113(b)(1)(A) would first require that economic
proposals be "reasonably necessary" for the successful reorganization of the
debtor, and second, permit the debtor to propose non-economic modifications
that are not required for reorganization. This standard would impose clearer
obligations on the debtor, requiring it to propose modifications that are
necessary, within reason, to the debtor's eventual reorganization, while also
permitting the debtor to propose other, non-essential modifications to the
bargaining agreement. Permitting the debtor to make these proposals would
encourage the parties to engage in more robust negotiations, giving full effect to
both national labor policy and § 1113 while reducing the chances that the debtor
will end up rejecting the collective bargaining agreement, causing the union to
go on strike.
These proposed changes may be rendered meaningless, however, with the
enactment of the Protecting Employees and Retirees in Bankruptcy Act of 2007. If
passed, the 2007 Act would place a substantial hurdle in front of debtors
looking to reject collective bargaining agreements. The act, while codifying the
strict standard of necessity from Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, places a greater
emphasis on negotiation than does the current code. With a Democratically

116. See Maher, supra note 111, at A2,
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controlled Congress and White House, passage of the 2007 Act appears likely,
although it remains to be determined whether it will emerge from conference
containing the same pro-labor biases with which it entered.

